The analysis of multi-homing P2P lending platforms' profit model and pricing problem: A two-stage dynamic game model
LIU He1,2, HUAN Zhenglin2, ZHENG Jiali1,2, QIAO Han2, WANG Shouyang1,2
1. Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
Abstract：Based on the traditional two-sided market theory and the characteristics of P2P lending platforms, this paper proposes a two-stage game model to analyse different business models, especially profit models of P2P lending platforms. With the purpose of showing the continuous operating condition and developing direction of P2P lending platforms under the financial environment in China, this paper takes China's new policies about P2P into consideration, takes account of impact of policy and finds the following results:1) under the scenario in which P2P platform charges "subscription fee + transaction fee" or "subscription fee only", network externalities reduces the P2P platforms' profit when lenders are multihoming; 2) adopting the profit model of "subscription fee + transaction fee" makes a higher profit than the profit model of "subscription fee only"; 3) the prohibition in existing policies of P2P lending platforms on principal guaranteed model will protect the interests of lenders. Finally, this paper puts forward policy suggestions of the P2P lending platforms in China.
刘赫, 郇正林, 郑嘉俐, 乔晗, 汪寿阳. 多归属P2P网贷平台定价及盈利模式分析:一个两阶段动态博弈模型[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(7): 1669-1679.
LIU He, HUAN Zhenglin, ZHENG Jiali, QIAO Han, WANG Shouyang. The analysis of multi-homing P2P lending platforms' profit model and pricing problem: A two-stage dynamic game model. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(7): 1669-1679.
[1] Berger S, Gleisner F. Emergence of financial intermediaries in electronic markets:The case of online P2P lending[J]. Business Research Journal, 2009, 2:39-65. [2] 叶湘榕. P2P借贷的模式风险与监管研究[J]. 金融监管研究, 2014(3):71-82.Ye X R. Research of risks and supervision of P2P lending model[J]. Financial Regulation Research, 2014(3):71-82. [3] Morse A. Peer-to-peer crowdfunding:Information and the potential for disruption in consumer lending[J]. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2015, 7:463-482. [4] Yum H, Lee B, Chae M. From the wisdom of crowds to my own judgment in microfinance through online peer-to-peer lending platforms[J]. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 2012, 11(5):469-483. [5] Lin M, Prabhala N R, Viswanathan S. Judging borrowers by the company they keep:Friendship networks and information asymmetry in online peer-to-peer lending[J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(1):17-35. [6] 陈冬宇, 郑海超. 我国P2P网贷市场的羊群行为及其决策理性研究[J]. 管理评论, 2017(1):3-11.Chen D Y, Zheng H C. A study of herd behavior and its rationality in China's online peer-to-peer lending market[J]. Management Review, 2017(1):3-11. [7] Guo Y, Zhou W, Luo C, et al. Instance-based credit risk assessment for investment decisions in P2P lending[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, 249(2):417-426. [8] 张春霞, 蔡炎宏, 刘淳. 竞争条件下的P2P网贷平台定价策略研究[J]. 清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2015(4):470-474. Zhang C X, Cai Y H, Liu C. Pricing strategy of P2P online lending platforms for competitive conditions[J]. Journal of Tsinghua University, 2015(4):470-474. [9] Roger G. Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation[J]. Journal of Economics, 2017, 120(3):193-217. [10] Zhu F, Iansiti M. Entry into platform-based markets[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2012, 33(1):88-106. [11] Parker G G, Van Alstyne M W. Two-sided network effects:A theory of information product design[J]. Management Science, 2005, 51(10):1494-1504. [12] 万兴, 高觉民. 纵向差异化双边市场中平台策略[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(4):934-941. Wan X, Gao J M. Platform strategy in vertically differentiated two-sided markets[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2013, 33(4):934-941. [13] 纪汉霖, 王小芳. 平台差异化且用户部分多归属的双边市场竞争[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2014, 34(6):1398-1406. Ji H L, Wang X F. Competition model of two-sided markets with platform differentiation and users partially multihoming[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2014, 34(6):1398-1406. [14] Rochet J C, Tirole J. Two-sided markets:A progress report[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37(3):645-667. [15] 程贵孙, 陈宏民, 孙武军. 双边市场下电视传媒平台兼并的福利效应研究[J]. 管理科学学报, 2009, 12(2):9-18. Cheng G S, Chen H M, Sun W J. Analysis of the welfare effects of television media platform merger in two-sided markets[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2009, 12(2):9-18. [16] 骆品亮, 傅联英. 零售企业平台化转型及其双边定价策略研究[J]. 管理科学学报, 2014, 17(10):1-12.Luo P L, Fu L Y. Platformization and two-sided pricing strategies for retailers[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2014, 17(10):1-12. [17] 詹欣, 乔晗. 移动近场支付产业可信服务管理平台博弈策略研究——基于双边市场理论视角[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(9):2259-2267. Zhan X, Qiao H. Research on game theory strategy of trusted service management platform in mobile near field payment industry-Based on two-sided markets theory[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2016, 36(9):2259-2267. [18] Wright J. The determinants of optimal interchange fees in payment systems[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004, 52(1):1-26. [19] Economides N, Katsamakas E. Two-sided competition of proprietary vs. open source technology platforms and the implications for the software industry[J]. Management Science, 2006, 52(7):1057-1071. [20] Rochet C, Tirole J. Platform competition in two-sided markets[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, 1(4):990-1029. [21] Hagiu A. Pricing and commitment by two-sided platforms[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37(3):720-737. [22] Armstrong M, Wright J. Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts[J]. Economic Theory, 2007, 32(2):353-380. [23] Armstrong M. Competition in two-sided markets[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37(3):668-691.
2019, Vol. 39 
