Study on evolutionary games and cooperation mechanism within the framework of bounded rationality
WANG Xian-jia1,2, QUAN Ji2, LIU Wei-bing3
1. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China;
2. Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China;
3. School of Political Science and Public Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
Abstract：This paper gives the theory defects of the traditional game theory and Nash equilibrium solution under the assumption of fully rationality, thus introduces evolutionary game theory, which is in the framework of bounded rationality. It describes the evolutionary thinking of strategies in evolutionary games, proposes that the essence of bounded rationality is learning, and then explores variety learning models in the evolutionary games. It introduces the agent-based learning models and progress in evolutionary games on networks; proposes the idea of explaining some complex network structure in reality using evolutionary game theory; analyzes the coevolutionary thinking of network structure and strategies in games. It discusses progress in mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary games. Finally, some comments are given for the development trends and the future research directions of the evolutionary games.
王先甲, 全吉, 刘伟兵. 有限理性下的演化博弈与合作机制研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2011, 31(专刊1): 82-93.
WANG Xian-jia, QUAN Ji, LIU Wei-bing. Study on evolutionary games and cooperation mechanism within the framework of bounded rationality. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2011, 31(专刊1): 82-93.
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