Abstract：Based on bounded rationality, adaptive expectations and disequilibrium market, the dynamic model of game among developers, local government, financial institutions and buyers in regional real estate market is built. Using game theory, dynamical systems theory and numerical simulation and DFC method, the authors study the dynamic evolution of the game. The results show that the asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium of the game can be reached by dynamic game among 4 main bodies of the market with bounded rationality on condition that regional real estate market supply and demand are unbalanced. The rising of rigid demand rate of the buyers, land remediation cost rate, urbanization rate, degree of financial dependence on the land and housing rental rate will all promote the equilibrium value of the supply, demand and prices in the real estate industry. And the rising of the property maintain tax rate, secondary transaction tax rate and real estate investment opportunity cost rate will all make the real estate industry supply, demand and prices downturn. However, the rising of comprehensive tax rate that the real estate developers burden will promote the equilibrium value of demand and prices. The authors suggest that the Central Government's real estate market regulation policies making should focus on the urbanization, land financial, the property maintain tax, secondary transaction tax and fee, investment opportunity cost and indemnificatory housing construction, rather than directly to focus on supply, demand and developers' comprehensive tax burden rate. The Central Government should adjust expectations of the main bodies of the market, and take advantage of the market self-regulation to achieve the healthy sustainable development of real estate market.
陈迅, 赖纯见. 区域房地产市场四方有限理性博弈研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(4): 857-874.
CHEN Xun, LAI Chunjian. Research on the game of 4-player with bounded rationality in regional real estate market. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2016, 36(4): 857-874.
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2016, Vol. 36 
