Research on quantity discount in sequential auctions based on bi-level programming
WANG Xian-jia1, YANG Sen2, HUANG Bin-bin3
1. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China; 2. Math and Information Science Department, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou 450046, China; 3. Jiangxi Province Key Laboratory of Water Resources and Water Environment, Nanchang 330099, China
Abstract：In order to improve the seller's ex ante expected revenue in a two-stage sequential auction, this paper introduces quantity discount into sequential auction and the problem is a bi-level programming problem essentially. We derive the buyers' equilibrium bidding strategies, then set up the seller's programming problem and obtain the optimal quantity discount by solving it. In the end, the price trend under the optimal quantity discount is studied. Analysis results show that whether adopting quantity discount can improve the seller's expected revenue depends on two factors: whether quantity discount can induce higher bids for the buyers and whether two objects can be allocated to different buyers, which has an important instructive significance in organizing auctions.
王先甲, 杨森, 黄彬彬. 基于二层规划的序贯拍卖中的数量折扣研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2014, 34(4): 878-882.
WANG Xian-jia, YANG Sen, HUANG Bin-bin. Research on quantity discount in sequential auctions based on bi-level programming. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2014, 34(4): 878-882.
2014, Vol. 34 
