Evolutionary game analysis of regional environmental protection programme
JIN Shuai1,2, DU Jian-guo1,2, SHENG Zhao-han2
1. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China; 2. Computational Experiment Center for Social Science, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
Abstract：The dynamic evolution process of regional environmental protection programme is analyzed based on an evolutionary game model, where the payoff matrix is dynamic rather than static. The results show that the evolution of system has multiple equilibriums, and the evolutionary stable strategies are largely affected by the initial population states and mutual incentive situations of both the government and social subject. Furthermore, the boundary conditions as well as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effective enforcement of regional environmental protection programme are identified. Finally, some relative policy recommendations are proposed according to China's environmental protection situation.
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2015, Vol. 35 
