Analysis on the risk prevention strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits based on game theory models
LI Xuerong1, WANG Xiaoxin1, QIAO Han1,2
1. School of Economics & Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China; 2. Key Laboratory of Big Data Mining and Knowledge Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
Abstract：Because of the complexity, sensitivity and high-risk of prosecution-related letters and visits, any carelessness in reception could cause social problems of harm to people's lives and property safety. This paper is the first attempting to analyze risk prevention strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits using game theory models. Static game models of incomplete information are established to analyze trial strategies; dynamic game models of incomplete information are established to analyze reception strategies. The equilibrium outcomes show that there exist unreasonable factors in the reception strategies of the People's Court, and scientific early warning systems could prevent risk of prosecution-related letters and visits, and efficiently allocate judicial resources. In the perspective of the People's Court, this paper combines equilibrium outcomes of games and risk early warning models, and proposes risk prevention and coping strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits.
李雪蓉, 王小新, 乔晗. 涉诉信访博弈模型构建与风险防范策略研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(1): 127-135.
LI Xuerong, WANG Xiaoxin, QIAO Han. Analysis on the risk prevention strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits based on game theory models. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2016, 36(1): 127-135.
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2016, Vol. 36 
