Abstract：This article studied the kind of charitable fund allocation problem which is consist of N applicants and an allocator, aiming at maximizing the social welfare and finally designed a corresponding allocation and inspection mechanism when the applicants are all identical. The mechanism stops the lying behavior of applicants effectively based on the dominant incentive compatible constraints. The results show that truth reporting is a Nash equilibrium for each applicant considering that the other applicants report truthfully. The allocation of each applicant relies on the worst type applicant in each report under the optimized allocation situation. Through an example analysis of two applicants, the manipulation of this new mechanism is identified. The research provides a reference for such kind of funding allocation and inspection problem.
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2016, Vol. 36 
