Food company regulation game research under government participation
CAO Yu1, YU Chuanyan1, WAN Guangyu2
1. Business School, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China; 2. Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798, Singapore
Abstract：Effective government regulation is an important approach to control food safety incidents. In this paper, we establish a symmetric game model to study the strategy choice of food enterprises under government participation, explore government regulation failures with the number of food enterprise increases. The research suggests that when the number of food enterprises increases on the market, the border earnings of non-self-discipline enterprises increase, more enterprises becomes non-self-discipline and provide unsafe food production; that is the reason why the fixed checking probability of government cannot adapt to the market situation where many food enterprises coexistence. In the game, inspect frequency of government, cost of self-discipline and punishment of non-self-discipline are the most important for enterprise which could affect the choice of behavior. In order to cope with the failure of the government regulation effectively, the government should increase inspect frequency, reduce the cost of self-discipline, and increase the punishment of non-self-discipline.
曹裕, 俞传艳, 万光羽. 政府参与下食品企业监管博弈研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2017, 37(1): 140-150.
CAO Yu, YU Chuanyan, WAN Guangyu. Food company regulation game research under government participation. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2017, 37(1): 140-150.
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2017, Vol. 37 
