Probabilistic selling strategy study based on dynamic evolution game theory
YANG Guang1, LIU Xinwang1, QIN Jindong2
1. School of Management and Economics, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China; 2. School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Abstract:Under duopoly retailers controlling products selling background in differentiated-quality product markets, we analyse the strategies of duopoly retailers with probabilistic selling (PS) or traditional selling (TS), by using Hotelling model and dynamic evolution game theory. The results show that duopoly retailers strategy choice are affected by the recognition level of consumers for probabilistic selling and the degree of difference between differentiated-quality products as well as considering other special type consumers' demands. That is if the recognition level of consumers for probabilistic products are big enough to make up for their the difference degree between the products, then consumers will choose probabilistic product; otherwise, the consumers will choose traditional products. The retailers should adopt to mixed strategies for the uncertain consumers, the consumers who don't consume probabilistic products completely and other special type consumers. These results have some guiding significance for PS practices.
杨光, 刘新旺, 秦晋栋. 关于概率销售的动态演化博弈研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2017, 37(9): 2231-2243.
YANG Guang, LIU Xinwang, QIN Jindong. Probabilistic selling strategy study based on dynamic evolution game theory. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2017, 37(9): 2231-2243.
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