Abstract：We study the impact of retailer's cost sharing behavior on the key decisions of closed loop supply chain when the manufacturer is responsible for the collection of used products. Specifically, the cost sharing is characterized by two ways:1) the retailer directly promises to share a part of the collection costs with the manufacturer, and 2) the retailer and the manufacturer negotiate to determine optimal sharing mechanism. Furthermore, we establish two theoretical models (CSR & CSB) and compare equilibrium strategies and profits with other two cases without cost sharing (NI & ND). Compared with a decentralized channel without cost sharing, we find that collection cost sharing always benefits the manufacturer and whole channel system, and the manufacturer inclines to prefer CSB model over CSR model. In addition, the manufacturer and the retailer are better off in the CSR model, while the retailer is worse off in the CSB model (reservation profit is not guaranteed). Hence, we illustrate how two-part tariff contract or profit sharing contract can improve the CSB model and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win situation. Finally, numerical examples are performed to analyze the impact of key parameters on the equilibrium and contracts.
郑本荣, 杨超, 刘丛. 成本分摊对制造商回收闭环供应链的影响[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2017, 37(9): 2344-2354.
ZHENG Benrong, YANG Chao, LIU Cong. The effect of cost sharing on manufacturer collecting closed loop supply chain. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2017, 37(9): 2344-2354.
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2017, Vol. 37 
