Abstract：Competition among enterprises has evolved into competition among supply chains. This paper studies two supply chains consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering the risk aversion characteristics of a manufacturer in a supply chain, it compares the optimal R&D effort decision-making of supply chain under five competitive modes:Complete competition, single supply chain cooperation (supply chain 1 or 2 cooperation), supply chain internal cooperation and supply chain R&D cooperation. The results show that the increase of R&D cost coefficient or risk aversion degree will reduce the R&D level of manufacturers, but it can stimulate the R&D efforts of competitive supply chains, while market fluctuation is not always beneficial to the improvement of R&D level of competitive supply chains; for supply chain profits, risk aversion degree and market fluctuation will reduce the profits of two supply chains; although the R&D level of manufacturers in the range of the supply chain R&D cooperation mode is the best, but the profit of the supply chain is not necessarily the best. The profit of the supply chain cooperation mode is better than that of the competitive supply chain non-cooperation mode.
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2019, Vol. 39 
