Abstract：In the process of enterprise organization and management, effective incentive is one of the most important behavioral driving forces to increase employees' efforts. When the salary and promotion plan of an enterprise are determined, it is of great significance to study how to further improve the incentive mechanism with the help of information theory. In this paper, we study information disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with incomplete information to characterize employees' equilibrium behaviors and the effects of different information disclosure policies on employees' efforts. We obtain that enterprises should choose not to publicly disclose the performance appraisal results in order to fully mobilize employees to work hard, and employees also don't have motivation to tell each other about themselves appraisal results, it ensures the effectiveness of the information disclosure mechanism. According to the conclusion of this paper, we believe that on the basis of the existing incentive theory, we should further optimize the effective incentive to employees and improve the efficiency and competitiveness of enterprises from the perspective of information disclosure mechanism design.
马洪坤, 李仲飞. 基于不完全信息竞赛理论的员工激励机制研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(10): 2535-2548.
MA Hongkun, LI Zhongfei. Staff incentive mechanism based on the contest theory with asymmetric information. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(10): 2535-2548.
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2019, Vol. 39 
