Stochastic evolutionary game model of international anti-terrorism alliance under uncertain environment
WANG Tianhua1, LIU Dehai1, WANG Lei2
1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China; 2. Department of Public Security, Criminal Investigation Police University of China, Shenyang 110854, China
Abstract：The counter-terrorism decision-making of the members of the international anti-terrorism coalition is faced with externally complicated random factors such as political competition, religious beliefs and national structure, which brings about high uncertainty for the international counter-terrorism situation. This paper constructs a stochastic evolution model based on the Moran process for the international anti-terrorism situation in a highly uncertain environment. Then, the equilibrium results of the counter-terrorism strategies under different random disturbance intensities are calculated under the three scenarios of stochastic factor dominance, expected payoff dominance and super-expected payoff dominance. Studies have shown that the governments adopt "preemptive strike" or "passive response" strategy, which mainly depend on three factors:1) Irrational external random factors; 2) The scale of the anti-terrorist coalition; 3) Cost-benefit of different counter-terrorism strategies. If the irrational random factors dominate the decision-making, the cost-benefit of the two strategies and the numbers determine the strategic choice of the member states. If the expected payoff dominates the decision-making, the "preemptive strike" strategy will become the general consensus of all member states only when the number of members of the anti-terrorist coalition is greater than a numerical value. Otherwise, the "passive response" anti-terrorist free-riding behavior will become stable strategy.
王天华, 刘德海, 王雷. 不确定环境下国际反恐联盟随机演化博弈模型[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(12): 3139-3150.
WANG Tianhua, LIU Dehai, WANG Lei. Stochastic evolutionary game model of international anti-terrorism alliance under uncertain environment. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(12): 3139-3150.
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2019, Vol. 39 
