Abstract：The medical dispute has been the important contradiction restricting the development of harmonious society, while government regulation will play an important role in strategy choice of both sides when resolving disputes. This article analyzes the influence of the degrees of governmental regulation to doctor-patient strategies by building the doctor-patient evolution game model. The study results indicate that different degrees of regulation result in different strategy profile, different regulation efforts to doctor and patient will determine the operation status and behavior choice separately. The government's improvement of the regulation standard to hospitals and patients will gradually raise the probability of hospitals to operate specifically, regulate patients' routes and ways to safeguard legal rights, and finally normalized the behaviors of both sides. The behaviors of "medical disturbance" are somehow a way to expose the operation status of hospitals; different self-positioning of the government in medical disputes determines different strategies, which resulted in a relatively big difference in the results of the medical disputes. Finally, this article discusses the evolution results under the circumstances of insufficient governmental regulation and improper regulation strategies combing with the Putian Medical Group and Medical Dispute in Nanping, Fujian.
管欣, 张哲薇, 陈张蕾, 高杨. 政府规制下的医患纠纷演化博弈模型[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(12): 3151-3162.
GUAN Xin, ZHANG Zhewei, CHEN Zhanglei, GAO Yang. The evolutionary game model of medical dispute under the regulation of the government. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2019, 39(12): 3151-3162.
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2019, Vol. 39 
