Study on the supply mode selection of generic technology from the technology chain perspective
ZHENG Yuelong1,2, REN Yi3
1. Engineering Research Center for Waste Oil Recovery Technology and Equipment of Ministry of Education, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China; 2. School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China; 3. Research Center for the Economy of the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
Abstract：Combining the analysis of generic technology R&D process and its technology chain, learning from the Stackelberg's game theory, a game model is established by introducing such parameters as vertical diffusion difficulty, technical elasticity and subsequent development difficulty. This paper analyzes the generic technology supply mode and its selection problem considering diffusion process from technology chain perspective. The results show that compared with the government-led model and the government-market integration model, the market-led model is not desirable. Specifically, with the increase of the success rate of supply, the decrease of the difficulty of vertical diffusion, the increase of technical elasticity (as long as the difficulty of vertical diffusion is not too great and the success rate of supply is not too small) and the increase of the influence of upstream enterprises (the expected return of downstream enterprises under the corresponding government-market combination mode is lower than that under the government-led mode), the level of upstream and downstream enterprises' efforts and the expected returns of game participants under the government-market integration model are higher than those under the government-led model, and the level of effort and returns of downstream enterprises are later than those of upstream enterprises. Otherwise the government-led supply mode is more dominant. Finally, the management enlightenments are disscussed for the issue of promoting generic technology supply and mode selection.
郑月龙, 任毅. 技术链视角下产业共性技术供给模式选择研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(4): 915-932.
ZHENG Yuelong, REN Yi. Study on the supply mode selection of generic technology from the technology chain perspective. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(4): 915-932.
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2020, Vol. 40 
