The signaling behavior of three-player games on P2P platforms
GU Dingwei1,2, ZHAO Xi3, LUO Pinliang3
1. School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China; 2. Shanghai Institute of International Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China; 3. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
Abstract：From the perspective of the two-sided market, we construct a game model among online P2P lending platform (P2P platform), borrowers and lenders, to study the signaling behavioral differences between superior and inferior platforms and its influencing factors. We find that: 1) P2P platforms, as information intermediaries, can convey information, which can be real information as well as false information, or not. The validity of truthfully signaling relies on the signaling costs. 2) P2P platforms are willing to genuinely signal if and only if the signaling costs are at middle-level. 3) Moreover, the possibility of genuine information is influenced by the fees P2P platforms charge to borrowers and lenders, characteristics of projects and financial costs. 4) Therefore, according to the traits of three-player games, the regulator should pay attention to low-quality success rate as well as financial costs, build the credible guarantee on signaling behavioral carrier of P2P platforms and make policy pool efforts.
古定威, 赵曦, 骆品亮. P2P平台信号显示的三方博弈模型研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(5): 1210-1220.
GU Dingwei, ZHAO Xi, LUO Pinliang. The signaling behavior of three-player games on P2P platforms. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(5): 1210-1220.
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2020, Vol. 40 
