Profit allocation of benefit-sharing water saving management contract based on bargaining model
WANG Xiaosheng1, HU Hao2, LIU Xinxin1, AN Xiaojie1
1. School of Mathematics and Physics, Hebei University of Engineering, Handan 056038, China; 2. School of Management Engineering and Business, Hebei University of Engineering, Handan 056038, China
Abstract：Aiming at the benefit distribution problem of benefit-sharing water saving management contract, a dynamic game benefit distribution scheme based on bargaining model is proposed. Considering the bid order has a significant impact on the equilibrium, this paper takes the equilibrium of both parties when they bid first respectively as their respective allocations, then compares the the size of the total "cake" and the sum of allotments, a interest allocation game model discussed by cases is established. Furthermore, to make the distribution result of convergence, introducing the benefit deficiency and consumption factors, on the basis of interest allocation game, the game model of deficiency apportion is further established, which makes the research result more perfect. The result shows that: 1) The benefit distribution of participants is closely related to discount factor, fixed cost and consumption factor; 2) When the sum of allotments is not greater than the total "cake", the benefit distribution scheme can be solved in the interest allocation game, otherwise, the solution of benefit distribution scheme needs to combine interest allocation game and deficiency apportion game; 3) Under the benefit-sharing water saving management contract, water saving service company enjoy more water saving benefits.
王小胜, 胡豪, 刘欣欣, 安笑洁. 基于讨价还价模型的分享型合同节水管理利益分配[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(9): 2418-2426.
WANG Xiaosheng, HU Hao, LIU Xinxin, AN Xiaojie. Profit allocation of benefit-sharing water saving management contract based on bargaining model. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(9): 2418-2426.
[1] 王华, 卢顺光. 合同节水管理模式及其运行机制框架[J]. 中国水利, 2015(19):6-8+12.Wang H, Lu S G. Contrac management model for water conservation and framework for its operational mechanism[J]. China Water Resource, 2015(19):6-8+12. [2] 刘海亮, 王锡钢. 基于EMC的风险系数的效益分享模型[J]. 辽宁科技大学学报, 2011, 34(5):495-498.Liu H L, Wang X G. Research of income sharing model of risk factor in energy management contracting[J]. Journal of University of Science and Technology Liaoning, 2011, 34(5):495-498. [3] 徐进才, 徐艳红, 庞欣超, 等. 基于"贡献-风险"的农地征收转用土地增值收益分配研究——以内蒙古和林格尔县为例[J]. 中国土地科学, 2017, 31(3):28-35.Xu J C, Xu Y H, Pang X C, et al. Study on land incremental value distribution based on contribution risk analysis of farmland acquisition[J]. China Land Sciences, 2017, 31(3):28-35. [4] 杨翠兰. 基于风险和贡献的知识链成员间收益分配研究[J]. 图书情报工作, 2010, 54(14):88-91.Yang C L. Research on the income distribution among members of knowledge chain based their risk and contribution[J]. Library and Information Service, 2010, 54(14):88-91. [5] Yan X, Chong H Y, Zhou J, et al. Concession model for fair distribution of benefits and risks in build-operate-transfer road projects[J]. Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 2019, 25(3):265-275. [6] 范闯, 刘玉明. 浅析PPP模式的智慧城市建设风险与利益分配方法[J]. 哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2019, 21(2):135-140.Fan C, Liu Y M. Smart city construction risk and benefit distribution method based on PPP mode[J]. Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition), 2019, 21(2):135-140. [7] 叶晓甦, 吴书霞, 单雪芹. 我国PPP项目合作中的利益关系及分配方式研究[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2010, 27(19):36-39.Ye X S, Wu S X, Shan X Q. Research on the interest relationship and distribution mode of PPP project cooperation in China[J]. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2010, 27(19):36-39. [8] 安晓伟, 王卓甫, 丁继勇, 等. 联合体工程总承包项目优化收益分配谈判模型[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2018, 38(5):1183-1192.An X W, Wang Z F, Ding J Y, et al. Negotiation model of union general contracting project optimization profit distribution[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2018, 38(5):1183-1192. [9] Gao J, Yang X, Liu D. Uncertain Shapley value of coalitional game with application to supply chain alliance[J]. Applied Soft Computing, 2017, 56:551-556. [10] Mohebbi S, Li X. Coalitional game theory approach to modeling suppliers' collaboration in supply networks[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 169:333-342. [11] 王雪, 张培文, 孙宏. 基于资源投入的供应链联盟利益分配方案研究[J]. 统计与决策, 2018, 34(11):55-59.Wang X, Zhang P W, Sun H. Research on benefit distribution scheme of supply chain alliance based on resource input[J]. Statistics & Decision, 2018, 34(11):55-59. [12] 刘家财, 李登峰, 胡勋锋. 区间值最小二乘核仁解及在供应链合作利益分配中的应用[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(12):78-87.Liu J C, Li D F, Hu X F. Interval-valued least square nucleolus and its application in cooperative profit allocation of supply chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(12):78-87. [13] Teng Y, Li X, Wu P, et al. Using cooperative game theory to determine profit distribution in IPD projects[J]. International Journal of Construction Management, 2019, 19(1):32-45. [14] 骆进仁, 刘姗. 跨流域调水工程水资源供应链利益博弈分析[J]. 软科学, 2018, 32(5):49-54.Luo J R, Liu S. Game analysis of supply chain profits of inter-bain water diversion project[J]. Soft Science, 2018, 32(5):49-54. [15] 王大澳, 菅利荣, 王慧, 等. 基于限制合作博弈的产业集群企业利益分配研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(4):171-178.Wang D A, Jian L R, Wang H, et al. Study on profit allocation of industrial cluster based on restricted cooperative game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(4):171-178. [16] 张瑜, 菅利荣, 刘思峰, 等. 基于优化Shapley值的产学研网络型合作利益协调机制研究——以产业技术创新战略联盟为例[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(9):36-44.Zhang Y, Jian L R, Liu S F, et al. Interest coordination mechanism of university-industry network cooperation based on optimized Shapley value-A case study in industrial technology innovation strategy alliance[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(9):36-44. [17] Shang T, Zhang K, Liu P, et al. What to allocate and how to allocate?-Benefit allocation in shared savings energy performance contracting projects[J]. Energy, 2015, 91:60-71. [18] 杨哲. 基于讨价还价理论的企业集团中的利益分配[J]. 管理工程学报, 2015, 29(4):140-144.Yang Z. Benefit distribution of industrial group based on the bargaining theory[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2015, 29(4):140-144. [19] 吴洁, 吴小桔, 车晓静, 等. 中介机构参与下联盟企业知识转移的三方利益博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(10):176-186.Wu J, Wu X J, Che X J, et al. Interests gaming analysis of knowledge transfer among three parties based on the participation of intermediary organ[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(10):176-186. [20] 彭勇, 李新新. 停车泊位共享收益分配研究——基于不完全信息讨价还价博弈模型[J]. 价格理论与实践, 2018(2):67-70.Peng Y, Li X X. Research on shared income allocation of parking berths-Bargaining game model based on incomplete information[J]. Price:Theory & Practice, 2018(2):67-70. [21] 蒋菱, 王峥, 黄仁乐, 等. 基于不完全信息下讨价还价模型的动态联盟利益分配研究[J]. 价值工程, 2016, 35(17):231-234.Jiang L, Wang Z, Huang R L, et al. Benefit distribution of dynamic alliance based on incomplete information bargain model[J]. Value Engineering, 2016, 35(17):231-234. [22] 郝德强. 基于净现值修正模型的风险投资项目价值评估[J]. 会计之友, 2013(11):57-60.Hao D Q. The value evaluation of venture capital project based on net present value correction model[J]. Friend of Accounting, 2013(11):57-60. [23] Rubinstein A. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J]. Econometrica, 1982, 50(1):97-109. [24] Shaked A, Sutton J. Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society, 1984, 52(6):1351-1364. [25] 万瑶. 基于讨价还价博弈的PPP项目风险再分担比例研究[D].天津:天津大学, 2017.Wan Y. Research on the risk reallocation proportion of PPP project based on bargaining game[D]. Tianjin:Tianjin University, 2017. [26] Muthoo A. Bargaining theory with applications[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999:41-71.
2020, Vol. 40 
